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What Estée Lauder’s Founder Knew About Compounding

Companies have learned to run their operations as one system. The path from where demand forms to the economic profit it creates is still managed in pieces. Connecting it is the next management idea.

I have a soft spot for Estée Lauder. The Spanish have a word for it, cariño, a mixture of affection, warmth, and appreciation that is hard to translate. As someone born in Germany who has made New York his home, I see the Lauder family everywhere in this city’s cultural life: in Leonard Lauder’s collection of Cubist masterpieces at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, in his long support of the Whitney, and in the Neue Galerie, which Ronald Lauder founded with Serge Sabarsky and which I particularly admire. Leonard Lauder died in June 2025. New York is richer for what he left behind.

So when the company presented its plan through fiscal 2030 in Shanghai on November 4, I read all of it: the press release and the ten presentations it filed with the SEC the same day. It is a strong plan, from a leadership team that has done real work. It is also, like almost every plan a large company publishes, shaped by the way companies are built to plan. And the more I read, the more I thought about a bath oil from 1953.

A bath oil that compounded

In the early 1950s, most women did not buy perfume for themselves. They received it as a gift, usually from a man, usually for an occasion: a birthday, an anniversary, Christmas. Perfume was something that happened to a woman a few times a year, and someone else made the decision.

Estée Lauder saw that this was a fact about how the market was organized, not about what women wanted. In 1953 she introduced Youth-Dew, a bath oil that doubled as a perfume. A bath oil was something a woman could buy for herself, at the counter, without an occasion and without asking anyone. And it went into a moment that happened every day.

Think about what that did to the economics. A gift is a single transaction. It does not make the next gift more likely. A daily ritual is different. Every bath made the next purchase more likely, every woman who wore it was noticed by other women, and every purchase deepened the relationship between a woman and a brand she had chosen herself. She did not win a bigger share of the gift market. She moved fragrance into a demand space the industry was not measuring, a woman’s own daily moment of care, and built a business whose returns grew on themselves.

That is the difference I want to draw in this article. Some growth is linear: you add a unit of effort and get a unit of result, and next year you start again. Some growth compounds: each turn makes the next turn more valuable. Youth-Dew was a compounding move. And I want to ask why compounding moves are so hard for large companies to make by design, however talented their leaders are.

What the plan gets right

Under CEO Stéphane de La Faverie, the company has done real work. Organic sales returned to growth in fiscal 2026, up 3% on net sales of about $15 billion, and the adjusted operating margin rose from 8.0% to 11.2%. The first quarter of fiscal 2027 brought 6% organic growth and a raised outlook. Consumer-facing investment has now increased for seven consecutive quarters.

The fiscal 2030 ambition is sustained mid-single-digit organic sales growth every year, an adjusted operating margin of 16.5% to 18.5%, and double-digit growth in adjusted earnings per share.

There is a lot to admire in how the company is getting there. It has built a Global Consumer Intelligence Operating System with five parts: a Trusted Fact Base, Insights on Growth Intersection, Multi-Layered Foresight Capabilities, Holistic Brand Performance Tracking, and a learning and testing plan for new products. It treats AI as “an enterprise capability with data as a strategic asset.” It has consolidated 31 regional media agencies into one. Its last five launches created in China for China reached the market in an average of nine months. And in April it announced two peer-reviewed papers on skin longevity in the Journal of Clinical and Aesthetic Dermatology, including a new model for measuring perceived facial age built from more than 2,800 women.

That is a serious company getting serious again, investing in its brands, its science and its understanding of consumers. Which is why the shape of the plan is worth looking at closely. It shows, more clearly than most, the system every large company plans within.

The shape of the plan

On one slide of the main strategy presentation, the company states its objective in a few words: “Outperform Global Prestige Beauty & Gain Share.”

Share is the most linear form of growth there is. You win a point by spending against competitors who are spending against you, and you have to win it again next year. It is also the smallest source of growth. When McKinsey studied growth champions in 2016, it found that market share gains accounted for only about 7% of corporate growth. Most growth came from being where demand was expanding, and from creating new demand.

Now look at how the value in the 2030 plan is presented. Sales are planned to grow at a mid-single-digit rate. Operating margin is planned to expand by 850 to 1,050 basis points over five years, helped by the completion of the Profit Recovery and Growth Plan and by a falling share of non-consumer-facing costs, which went from 29.1% of sales in fiscal 2025 to 27.7% in fiscal 2026. Much of the improvement in the 2030 story is expressed as margin.

That is valuable work, and I do not want to diminish it. Investors ask for exactly this: a growth rate, a margin bridge, earnings per share. Every company that presents a five-year plan presents it this way. But it means the plan is told through the income statement, one line at a time, and a margin gain from a cost program lifts profit once. It does not make next year’s gain larger.

The same pattern shows up in the most advanced part of the plan. The company’s AI-powered “Decision Intelligence” connects research and innovation, marketing, the value chain, and commercial teams. It is measured by time to insights, fill rate, and forecasting accuracy. Those are good metrics for a well-run supply chain. They tell you how well the company serves the demand it already has. They are not built to tell you which demand is worth creating.

What integration connected, and what it did not

For more than three decades, one idea has organized how large companies run. It began with process reengineering and enterprise systems in the 1990s. Around 2000 it was called business integration. In the 2010s it became digital transformation. Today it has its most powerful engine yet: AI. The names changed. The idea did not: connect processes, technology, and people so that the enterprise runs as one system.

It worked. Look at what it connected: orders, inventory, invoices, payroll, customer records. Integration connected the company’s transactions, first within its walls and then around the world. Estée Lauder’s One ELC operating model, with shared services, a global media model, and connected data, is integration done well. So is its AI program, with 90% active use of enterprise AI tools and more than half of its knowledge workers trained.

What integration did not connect, at least not in its systems, were the company’s decisions about value. Where is new demand forming? Which of it is worth pursuing? What must the brand mean to win it? What should we invent, and where should the money go?

Of course these decisions are connected. Every large company has a strategic planning process, with strategy reviews, portfolio reviews, innovation gates, and budget rounds, and talented people in strategy, marketing, R&D, and finance who bring it all together. But look at how the connection is made. It happens once a year, or once a quarter, in meetings, through presentations and spreadsheets, and in the judgment of the people in the room. The logic that links a shift in demand to a brand choice, an investment, and its economic return lives in people’s heads. The systems underneath record what was decided and what happened, rarely why. As the venture investor Ashu Garg put it last year, “Salesforce knows what happened. It doesn’t know why.”

The people who run these processes know their limits. In a Gartner survey of 243 chief sales officers at the end of 2024, fewer than half said their organization had met several of its strategic goals for the year. Gartner’s diagnosis was that they were “struggling to adjust their strategic plans to cope with the unexpected changes they face.” A Gartner survey of 403 chief marketing officers, published in 2025, found that 94% find it hard to translate their company’s strategic directives into actionable marketing plans, and 84% report high levels of what Gartner calls strategic dysfunction: objectives that are unclear, too numerous, or in conflict.

What has changed is the speed. The planning calendar assumes the world holds still long enough for a plan to be written, approved, and carried out. It no longer does. Demand now forms and shifts within months, often across the boundaries of industries. In PwC’s 2026 survey of 4,454 CEOs, 42% said their company had started competing in new sectors in the past five years. A process that connects decisions once a year, through people and slides, cannot keep pace with demand that moves every month.

David Collis of Harvard Business School has shown what this costs. In “Why Do So Many Strategies Fail?” he argues that leaders “either ignore the other components of strategy or don’t recognize the components’ interdependencies.” A strategy has to connect the opportunities a changing world creates with how a company creates value, captures it, and realizes it. In most companies, those are managed as separate pieces. Strategists see these connections. What they lack is a system that holds them together between planning cycles, and learns from the results.

The first wave of AI follows the old idea. Nearly eight in ten companies now use generative AI, and about as many report no material effect on earnings, a pattern McKinsey calls the “gen AI paradox.” BCG’s 2025 survey of more than 1,250 companies found that 60% reported minimal value from AI, and only 5% were creating value at scale. Bharat Anand and Andy Wu explain why in their HBR Prize–winning article, “The Gen AI Playbook for Organizations”: “Because everyone can use it, it becomes dramatically harder to capture value with it.” Michael Porter made the same point about operational effectiveness thirty years ago. It is necessary but not sufficient, because rivals copy it and competition converges.

The research is now converging on where the value lies. BCG finds about 70% of AI’s potential value in core functions such as sales and marketing, pricing, and R&D, and reports that the leaders reinvent core workflows end to end rather than automating tasks. Sangeet Paul Choudary, writing in HBR this year, argues that AI’s big payoff is coordination, not automation: it lowers the cost of getting teams, tools, and data that were never designed to work together to do exactly that. His advice to leaders is blunt: “Don’t look inside your company to figure out what to do with AI.”

I would take it one step further. The next integration will connect decisions: the choices along the path from where demand forms in people’s lives to the economic profit it creates.

The compounding enterprise

That is the next management idea. I call it the compounding enterprise. It takes the decisions a company already makes about demand, brands, innovation, and investment, and runs them as one system: around the same demand, measured in the same economic profit, and revisited as the evidence comes in.

It begins outside the company, where demand forms in people’s lives, often before any category can capture it. It follows that demand through the choices that shape and capture it: brands, innovation, business models, partners, and the interactions of the wider field in which the company operates. It ends with economic profit, which funds the next round of decisions. Then it learns, and goes around again.

Put the two ways of managing side by side:

• Managed in pieces, demand is a forecast. Managed as one system, demand is something to create, starting where it forms.

• Managed in pieces, strategy, brand, innovation, and investment each have their own owner and cycle. Managed as one system, they are decided together, around the same demand.

• Managed in pieces, each function has its own measure: share, equity, margin, return on spend. Managed as one system, they share one: economic profit.

• Managed in pieces, AI makes each function faster. Managed as one system, AI helps decide which demand to create and what it is worth.

• Managed in pieces, value is created through transactions that end. Managed as one system, it is created through interactions that compound.

The compounding enterprise starts outside the company, with demand. And it runs on three loops.

Each loop compounds a different asset. Interactions compound relationships in the market, economic profit compounds capital, and learning compounds what the company knows. Each also feeds the others: interactions produce the evidence learning needs, learning shows where capital should go, and economic profit funds the interactions that create the next round of demand.

Where it starts: demand, before the category

People do not organize their lives according to the categories companies use to manage their businesses. They pursue outcomes, solve problems, form habits, and respond to changes in their circumstances. In Hidden in Plain Sight in 2007, I argued that companies overlook growth because they begin with established market definitions rather than with the demand in people’s lives. I believe that argument is more pressing now, because demand forms across industry boundaries faster than any category report can register it.

I find it useful to think about growth as three dials. The first is discovery, which drives demand expansion: growth from new demand, not from a bigger slice of existing demand. The second is meaning, which drives willingness to pay. The third is reach, which drives penetration. Estée Lauder’s plan turns the third dial hard and the second in places. The first dial, the one Estée herself turned in 1953, is harder to see. Planning by category produces exactly this: when the category defines the market, growth is sought inside it.

Skin longevity shows what the first dial could look like.

Let me describe a hypothetical consumer. Call her Claire. She is 52, lives in Chicago, and works in finance. Every morning she uses a serum she researched for weeks. A few times a year she sees a dermatologist for laser resurfacing. She takes a collagen supplement and has asked her doctor about peptides. Before she bought her last serum, she asked ChatGPT to compare the clinical evidence behind three of them.

Claire is not an exotic case. In May, Boston Consulting Group and WWD published research based on more than 5,000 highly engaged US beauty consumers. They identified a group they call “optimizers”: people who in the past year used traditional beauty, aesthetic procedures, and performance and longevity offerings. Optimizers make up about 6% of US adults, roughly 15 million people, and spend around $3,000 a year across those three worlds. About three in four say they choose brands on proven efficacy and scientific validation. BCG’s conclusion is blunt: winners will own outcomes rather than just products.

Now ask which of Claire’s episodes Estée Lauder is present in. The serum, yes. The dermatologist’s chair, the supplement, the conversation with her doctor, the question she put to an AI: no. She is not shopping for prestige skin care. She wants to look and feel like herself as she gets older. That is her demand space, and prestige skin care sits inside it as one solution among several.